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Abstract
The paper explores main principles of financial planning in ex-ante deposit insur-
ance schemes from a theoretical perspective and in terms of the EU Directive on depos-
it-guarantee schemes. Further on, the paper assesses how these principles and standards 
are used in financial planning in deposit insurance schemes around the world for annual 
budgeting, strategic planning and optimalization of available financial resources. After 
reviewing available references and different practices, the conclusion is that there are no 
clear internationally accepted principles for deposit insurers’ financial planning, except 
some broad and general guidelines. Practices in the industry differ significantly. Given 
the fact that deposit insurance is in fact a monopolistic business, lack of clear principles 
and lack of proper financial planning may lead to inadequacy of ex-ante funds and neg-
ligence on the side of the management of deposit insurance schemes. 
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1 Introduction
Deposit insurance is a level of protection of deposits against bank failure established 
by regulation for. The purpose of deposit insurance is not to resolve banking crises, nor 
should it arouse any such expectations. Deposit insurance may be publicly or privately 
managed, involve narrow or broad responsibilities and roles in the overall financial safety 
net. Level and scopes of insurance differ among countries. The existence of deposit insur-
ance may be institutionalized or it may be established as a smaller organizational unit in 
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an existing regulatory body or government agency, but in any case the rules that govern 
its activities should always be clear in advance and prescribed in regulatory form. As in 
the insurance industry of the convention kind, the credibility of the insurer matters, even 
more so because depositors (i.e. those whose deposits are insured) do not have the abil-
ity to choose the insurer on the market. In other words, deposit insurance is a monopo-
listic business. Whatever goals, authority-given or management-chosen, a deposit insur-
ance scheme (further: DIS) always has the same task – to repay depositors in failed banks 
in a short time in order to prevent panicky domino effects and to preserve the stability 
of the financial system in general, together with other market participants. However per-
fect regulation may be, and however much procedures may be in place, the most crucial 
time for any DIS is when there is financial distress on the horizon. If a deposit insurance 
scheme fails when it is in the spotlight the damage is huge and credibility cannot be re-
stored easily. That is why the financial planning of adequate resources in the deposit in-
surance business is of great importance. It is a technical issue, more important from an 
operational perspective for the effectiveness of a DIS than from that of theory. But the-
ory should provide, at least, some clear internationally accepted guidelines for sound fi-
nancial planning practice.
From the theoretical perspective DIS financial planning is not an intriguing topic, 
and this has resulted in the paucity of references to that particular issue. Namely, there 
are number of references to discussions of general deposit insurance, its usefulness and 
burdens, the main characteristics of different models that may be found in practice, moral 
hazard and especially funding, from different perspectives1, but there are no references 
dedicated solely to financial planning in deposit insurance. 
The paper is not focused on the choice of funding in deposit insurance schemes it-
self, except in the part where funding and the regulatory solutions related to financial re-
sources determine financial planning. Obviously, financial planning is particularly im-
portant in schemes where ex ante funding exists and where the fund is created in advance 
and needs to be properly managed. For the given reasons, the paper is concentrated on fi-
nancial planning in ex-ante deposit insurance schemes. The main goal of this paper is to 
identify some main principles of financial planning in ex-ante deposit insurance schemes 
from a theoretical perspective in available references. Also, the paper explores the differ-
ent existing financial planning in DIS business practice. 
This paper is divided into three main parts. In the first part some concepts on finan-
cial planning arising from the chosen ex-ante funding from a theoretical perspective will 
be reviewed. The second part presents the EU perspective on financial planning issues. 
In the third part principles of financial planning in an ex ante DIS are addressed from the 
perspective of DIS practitioners, raising several important questions: (i) Are there enough 
resources in the fund? (ii) Should there be a target and how should it be set? (iii) What is 
the optimal size of the fund? (iv) What are optimal premiums for banks? (v) How should 
risks be assessed if a decision is made to do so? 
As there are no internationally accepted financial planning standards for the deposit 
insurance industry, except for the broad and general guidelines that may be found in the 
1 See for e.g. Roy (2000), FDIC (2000), Laeven (2002), Frolov (2004), Šonje (2006) where different aspects of 
funding in DIS may be found.371
Đ. Ognjenović: Basic Principles of Financial Planning in Ex-ante Deposit Insurance Schemes
Financial Theory and Practice 30 (4), 369-380 (2006)
available references to general topics about deposit insurance, financial planning practice 
differs among countries. When the framework is as broadly set as in this case, one can 
hardly argue that there is no link between these identified guidelines and the practices. 
But, given the size of the manageable funds in ex-ante schemes and the fact that deposit 
insurance is in fact a specific insurance business that deals with a number of risks, gener-
ally accepted financial planning standards should be developed and implemented.
2 Concepts of Financial Planning from a Theoretical Perspective
There are two basic types of DIS related to funding i.e. ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante 
DIS funding is a scheme where the regulator has decided to create up front a cash fund 
for the purpose of deposit insurance. The fund is created through different sources, for ex-
ample from (i) initial capital at the time of the establishment of the Fund and membership 
fees by member institutions, (ii) regular and additional premiums paid by member insti-
tutions, (iii) additional resources like borrowing from the market and/or budget, as lender 
of last resort. Contrary, an ex-post DIS does not create any funds up front, but only when 
there is a need for a payout. There are many pros and cons for each funding model. Roy 
(2000) provides an overview of the characteristics of the two different funding schemes 
and a relative evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of each. He argues that ex-
ante schemes are more effective but less efficient than ex-post deposit insurance schemes. 
When financial resources for deposit insurance are collected continually, a DIS is more 
liquid and ready for payouts when needed. Members pay premiums constantly at a time of 
prosperity as well as in times of recession. Premiums are paid by all member institutions 
not only those that have survived (which is the case of an ex-post DIS where resources are 
collected from surviving institutions in order to repay the deposits of a bankrupted insti-
tution). The existence of an ex-ante fund enhances depositor confidence. But, at the same 
time, the ex-ante fund must be managed, which increases operating costs compared to an 
ex-post DIS. Ex-post schemes do not impose an unnecessary burden on member institu-
tions during periods without bankruptcies, because they do not have to make payments to 
the fund and money may be used more efficiently. 
Traditionally, the main regular resource of any ex-ante DIS is the premium. 
Nevertheless, substantial amounts of resources may be ensured by establisher of the 
scheme at the beginning, as well as in exceptional circumstances such as banking crises. 
Premiums may be linear or differential. Premiums may be explicitly set in legislation as 
a percentage of some base such as total deposits, insured deposits, risk-weighted assets 
and similar, but some countries set only ceilings or ranges of annual premium in the na-
tional legislation, allowing in this way some flexibility in premium determination. Galac 
(2005) in his paper explains the economic and financial theory of the premium, as well as 
providing empirical evidence on the application of a risk-based premium. 
One of the main prerequisites for the success of any DIS is liquid and adequate finan-
cial resources (if an ex-ante fund has been developed) or fast access to raise the funds (abil-
ity to collect ex-post premiums, additional funding from government or on the market i.e. 
back-up funding). In both cases, funds are needed on time. The only way to achieve liq-
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ning in a DIS may have several meanings such as: budgeting for a year (“balancing future 
cash flows”), strategic planning (e.g. target funding) and, ideally, optimizing the size of the 
fund. When doing annual budgeting, a deposit insurance scheme forecasts its future cash 
flows. Annual budgeting in deposit insurance schemes is a simple projection of cash flow 
for next year. Such a projection starts with careful planning of all inflows and outflows 
for the next year on an item by item basis, taking into account all the determinants of the 
resources of the fund and the way it is used. Strategic planning is defined as mid and long 
term financial planning, which serve for determination of the targeted size of the fund. The 
target is usually set as percentage of the scheme’s potential liability for insured deposits 
or total deposits i.e. targeted coverage ratio. Coverage ratio is defined as ratio of available 
ex-ante funds to covered deposits (total deposits under insurance or total insured deposits 
i.e. total potential liability of the scheme). When setting the target size of its funds for e.g. 
2% of insured deposits, a deposit insurance scheme uses its planning for fine-tuning avail-
able resources in line with the set target. The coverage ratio serves as a tool for testing DIS 
financial strength. It may be used to see which banks can be “covered” with available re-
sources in the fund, for e.g. with a coverage ratio of 2% a deposit insurance scheme could 
pay out insured deposits simultaneously in x number of smallest banks or individually any 
bank except for e.g. y number of the largest banks. According to Garcia (1999) it is useful 
for a DIS to set targets in order to achieve and retain financial viability and avoid any fi-
nancial deficiencies that may even lead to the insolvency of a DIS. She argues that setting 
an appropriate target demands: … “a realistic assessment of the condition of the banking 
industry, the size and timing of the financial demands that are likely to be placed on the 
fund…” and the industry’s ability to pay the necessary premiums without prejudicing its 
profitability, solvency and liquidity. Although many countries set the target in the regula-
tion, the truth is that only few of them really do any serious analysis before determining 
the target. Optimalization of the fund’s size is the most advanced usage of the financial 
planning in any deposit insurance scheme. This means that financial planning is not only 
an analytical but also a strategic tool for the definition of what the size of the fund should 
be and how the liquidity needs of a DIS can be determined and structured. Optimalization 
of deposit insurance through financial planning means that a DIS tries to achieve optimal 
fund size (not too big, not too small) through optimal financing. 
Although the first deposit insurance schemes were established almost 70 years ago, 
there is no international regulatory body i.e. international standard-setter for deposit in-
surers around the world. Ex-ante DIS manage huge financial resources, contributed by 
members of the scheme and still there are no accepted principles for financial planning or 
financial management of such resources. Garcia (1999) identified a list of best practices 
in any scheme at normal times. Two of the items from her list – “pay depositors quickly” 
and “ensure adequate sources of funding to avoid insolvency” are, without any question, 
interrelated. These items may be identified as potential guidelines for establishing stand-
ards for operational practice. If there are delays in paying the depositors and if schemes 
are under-funded or insolvent, it will lead to departures from best practice. Garcia identi-
fied three practical issues that have to be resolved relating to adequate funding and they 
are: (i) to choose a funded or ex-post deposit insurance scheme, (ii) to determine the ap-
propriate levels for premiums and the accumulated fund and (iii) to decide on back-up 373
Đ. Ognjenović: Basic Principles of Financial Planning in Ex-ante Deposit Insurance Schemes
Financial Theory and Practice 30 (4), 369-380 (2006)
funding from the government. Questions listed first and last are always defined in the 
early stage of existence of any DIS and prescribed in the regulation. But issues related to 
the appropriate levels for premiums and the accumulated fund are still enigmatic in many 
schemes. There are no rules which clearly describe how to determine the appropriate lev-
els for premiums and especially desired size of the fund.
According to Financial Stability Forum (2001:26) “a DIS should have available all 
funding mechanisms necessary to ensure the prompt reimbursement of depositors’ claims 
after a bank failure”. Although this document was written by a group of deposit insurance 
practitioners from all around the world, they focused only on the issue from the regula-
tory prospective. This approach was meaningful at that time, when many schemes dealt 
with problems arising from poor regulatory solutions especially related with limited au-
thorities given. 
Roy (2000) gives an overview of funding issues and addresses optimal funding of a 
DIS providing the framework for analysis. He identified factors influencing the choice of 
ex-ante and ex-post schemes, as well as sufficiency of funding in DIS. According to Roy 
(2000:11), “to determine whether a given level of funding is sufficient, one needs to com-
pare the potential needs or losses with the resources that will be available.” This simple 
sentence explains the substance of the purpose of financial planning in deposit insurance 
in order to determine adequate funds. Later on, the paper provides an overview how the 
issue is approached in the practice. 
3 Financial Planning and Funding from EU Perspective
The European Union’s view on financial planning in DI is extremely important be-
cause it sets the general standards for regulators when framing DI regulation. For every 
EU member country has to set up domestic regulation within the framework given by 
European the Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes (1994:4) (further: EU Directive). 
That is why the EU Directive was able to take the responsibility of providing the substi-
tute for the missing international set of standards for financial planning at least for coun-
tries in the European Union. However, the EU Directive provides only broad rules and 
misses the chance to take the lead in the position of standard-setter for adequate funding. 
The EU Directive does not prescribe financing of DI or the method of premium collec-
tion, although its articles represent an important deposit insurance regulatory framework 
for any EU member country. Nenovsky and Dimitrova (2003) provide an interesting over-
view of problems arising from obligatory compliance with this EU Directive for EU ac-
cession countries. They argue that because of the EU Directive the model of regulation 
that should fit to all EU member countries, there are some evidences of over-insurance in 
accession countries which could lead to increasing moral hazard and costs of banking in 
the whole European Union.
The preamble of the EU Directive states: “… it is not indispensable, in this Directive, 
to harmonize the methods of financing schemes guaranteeing deposits or credit institu-
tions themselves, given, on the one hand, that the cost of financing such schemes must be 
borne, in principle, by credit institutions themselves and, on the other hand, that the fi-
nancing capacity of such schemes must be in proportion to their liabilities; whereas this 374
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must not, however, jeopardize the stability of the banking system of the Member State 
concerned.” The EU wants the issue of funding to be left to the responsibility of each 
DIS. But, the Directive also provides certain fundamental guidelines. The first one is that 
members have to pay for the deposit insurance. The second is that resources should be ad-
equate to meet potential liabilities. A DIS should establish funding mechanisms that are 
in proportion with its liabilities. Both principles are similar to those found in other refer-
ences mentioned in the paper, but are not deeper or more detailed.
While there were some discussions in the EU whether a revised Directive should be 
more precise in prescribing only ex-ante funding, appropriate coverage ratios and similar, 
it seems that these issues will stay as they are now.2 That is, the European Commission 
was tempted to make substantial changes in the Directive, but such a challenging task has 
been postponed for the time being. There are no written documents providing any expla-
nation of or reasoning behind such decision.
Table 1 provides an overview of funding schemes in EU countries. 
Table 1 Funding in EU countries
Funding Old members New members Total
ex-ante 8 8 16
combined 4 1 5
ex-post 3 1 4
Total 15 10 25
Source: Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali and Laeven (2005:35-38).
Ex-post schemes are in the minority in EU countries. Any serious conclusion about 
what type of scheme is better would be improper. Also, it is hard to identify the main rea-
sons why the majority among EU countries have chosen ex-ante funding, although re-
search into this particular issue would be interesting – to see the real reasons behind gov-
ernmental decisions.
During the revision process in the EU the European Commission (2005:4), identified 
four categories of schemes in relation to funding: (1) schemes with high ex-ante funding: 
keeping a high level of available funds and a coverage ratio of 2% or more; (2) schemes 
with medium ex-ante funding: coverage ratio around 1%; (3) schemes with low ex-ante 
funding: coverage ratio less than 1% (80% of depositors in the EU are covered by such 
schemes) and (4) ex-post funding. 
According to the European Commission’s Review of Directive (2005:5) the European 
Central Bank’s Banking Supervisory Committee, based on Moody’s financial strength rat-
ing had found that “there appeared to be no link between the financial strength of the na-
tional banking sector and the coverage ratios of the schemes.” This statement is result of 
2 Dirk Cupei during discussion and presentation at EFDI Conference on Deposit Insurance in Sarajevo, Decem-
ber 9th 2005.375
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the analysis of the EU schemes. The significant conclusion is that the financial strength 
of the members’ banking sectors (or financial weakness) may not be taken into consider-
ation as relevant when determining funding levels and funding mechanisms. This, also, 
means that risk assessment for the purpose of determination of financial exposure of de-
posit insurer was not taken into consideration as relevant for adequate funding. In other 
words, analysis showed that strategic financial planning in practice was rather poor and 
not based on the principles identified by Garcia relating to coverage ratios and setting the 
target size of the DI funds. 
4   Financial Planning in Ex-ante Deposit Insurance Schemes
from Practitioner Perspective
Like any other financial institution, every DIS should pay special attention to financial 
planning. Moreover, a DIS is concerned with a number of questions, such as: Are there 
enough resources in the fund? (ii) Should there be a target and how should it be set? (iii) 
What is the optimal size of the fund? (iv) What are the optimal premiums for banks? (v) 
How should risks be assessed if a decision is taken to do so? Proper financial planning 
helps in finding answers to all of these questions.
In practice, size and conduct of financial planning, as well as data used and method-
ology applied, differ significantly among deposit insurers. By definition, there is a differ-
ence in regular financial planning according to funding i.e. if there is an ex-ante, ex-post or 
combined DIS. Ex-post and combined schemes have to be focused on the risk of default i.e. 
bankruptcy and mechanisms for the fast collection of necessary resources. An ex-ante DIS 
is concerned about regular, constant collection and fulfilment of banks’ legal obligations as 
related to premium collections. There are many other variations, especially if collection is 
in relation to the risk of each particular member of the scheme. Furthermore, financial plan-
ning differs if the law explicitly sets the premium level as a percentage of a defined base or 
if the law only prescribes caps (or ranges) for the annual premium allowing the DIS to de-
termine each year a more appropriate level of premium. Criteria for determination of the 
annual premium may be set in the law itself or in the form of internal regulations. Financial 
planning differs and depends on the authority given to the DIS and availability of informa-
tion needed for analysis and/or on the level and maturity of cooperation among safety-net 
institutions. Functions of financial planning will determine the planning process, too. If a 
DIS chooses to use financial planning for budgeting purposes only, the data used and ap-
proach taken will not be the same as in a DIS which is trying to optimize its fund and uses 
financial planning for strategic reasons. But it is of great importance that, whatever the ap-
proach used, a DIS should focus its financial planning efforts on the available resources in 
relation to risk, i.e. the potential outflow for deposit payout. This is the only way it can de-
termine its adequate fund size and adequate financing needs. In order to assess the potential 
payout, a DIS must take into consideration the risks of the member institutions. 
Based on how the financial exposure (potential obligation) of a DIS is defined, two dif-
ferent financial planning approaches may be distinguished. The most traditional approach 
in financial planning is focused on DIS potential outflow defined as the sum of all insured 
deposits (amounts that should be compensated to depositors) in banks that may go bankrupt. 
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of any individual bank member of the scheme. Contrary to the traditional approach, the 
expected loss approach is focused on the final loss of the deposit insurance fund. Also, the 
expected loss approach is based on the assumptions that it is possible to differentiate equi-
ty needs from liquidity needs in deposit insurance. Capital needs may be related to regular 
financial resources that will not eventually be recovered in bankruptcy, which results in an 
ultimate loss for the DIS. Liquidity needs are defined as total amount that has to be com-
pensated to depositors i.e. insured deposits. That is the reason why liquidity needs may be 
financed from debt instruments. Total financial resources needs may be assumed based on 
an optimal combination of capital and liquidity needs. The same approach is helpful in de-
termination of the size of the fund, which does not have to be large as in the case of tradi-
tional approach, but only in proportion to the expected loss of the fund. In order to optimally 
structure liquidity and capital needs a DIS may use a number of financial instruments.3
4.1   Traditional approach in financial planning in an ex-ante deposit
insurance schemes
Regulation itself may provide constraints on planning. This would be the case when 
law either explicitly sets the premium as a percentage of a determined base or when bank 
risk information needed is not available to the DIS. 
Total available resources at one particular moment in time are calculated as the sum 
of total reserve-funds (already collected) + regular annual premium till the moment of 
bankruptcy + additional funds that may be collected if needed. 
When using simple annual budgeting for financial planning, a DIS should at least 
forecast its future cash flows i.e. plan its inflows and outflows in a 2 to 3 year horizon. 
Table 2 is a simplified illustrative example of such a cash flow projection. The DIS cal-
culates its total needed resources as the sum of insured deposits in banks that are estimat-
ed as capable of going bankrupt during that year. Risk may be assessed either directly by 
the DIS or by the supervisory institution.
The DIS from our example covers 15,000 Euro, has a legally prescribed annual pre-
mium of 0.5% on insured deposits as of the previous year. In order to do cash-flow pro-
jections from our example, the DIS has to make some assumptions, such as annual growth 
of deposits and insured deposits in order to determine its basis for premium calculation (in 
our example the assumption was 20% annual growth of insured deposits, based on present 
growth of deposits), percentage of expected recovery in bankruptcy, profit from invest-
ments (for e.g. 3% annually) and its operational costs. Even if the DIS does not take into 
account risk, cash flow projection helps to minimize “unpleasant surprises.” When plan-
ning the annual premium, if it is explicitly prescribed in the law, a DIS is limited by the 
fact that the amount that may be collected depends on the base for premium calculation, 
because a DIS cannot influence the percentage of the premium i.e. to increase it if there 
are higher needs. Usually, a DIS limited in its financial planning by regulation does not use 
risk assessment methodologies, because the two of them are contradictory. When planning 
total available resources, a DIS has to take into account all available financial resources, 
such as the additional premium as well. However, the projection of outflow may be com-
3 For details on this subject see Šonje (2006).377
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plete only when a potential liability is taken into account i.e. risk of default assumed and 
sum of all deposits eligible for compensation in banks identified as risky. If a DIS does not 
take the risk of the individual banks into the calculation, it “may hope” that its accumulat-
ed funds will be enough in the case of need and that information on such default will be 
known in time, in order to mobilize additional resources if needed. But, at the end of the 
day there is a question: how long may such an improvised approach survive?
Table 2   Illustrative example of a DIS cash-flow projection
(in million euro, except the coverage)
Items 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Actual figures Projection
coverage, in 000 eur 15 15 15 15 15
Resources
transferred from previous year at the beginning 55 51 69 85 105
bank annual premium, calculated on the insured 
deposits as of previous year 0.5% 10 12 15 18 21
profit from investment (average 3%) 1.9 1.9 2.5 3.1 3.8
expected recovery of claims from bankrupted 
banks (20%)
54
Total resources 71.9 69.9 86.5 106.1 130.8
Payments
operational costs and expenditures 0.5 0.7 1 1.5 2
compensation of depositors 20
total outflow 20.5 0.7 1 1.5 2
year end balance 51.4 69.2 85.5 104.6 128.8
total deposits under insurance at the end
of the year 4,500.0 5,400.0 6,480.0 7,776.0 9,331.2
total insured deposits at the end of the year 2,500.0 3,000.0 3,600.0 4,320.0 5,184.0
Exposure coverage ratio
(Year end balance/total insured deposits), in %
2.06 2.31 2.38 2.44 2.48
Source: author’s own calculation on illustrative figures
When regulations set a premium in a range (e.g. from 0.1% to 0.2%) or as a cap (e.g. 
up to 0.2%), a DIS is forced to apply more serious annual financial planning. If a DIS has 
properly developed methodology in order to calculate the adequate premium for each year, 
it may influence the level of its regular financial resources up to a certain limit (prescribed 
by the law). This approach is more flexible, because the DIS may increase or decrease pre-
miums over time. That is, if a DIS used information about its total potential risk (based on 
risk of individual banks) in relation to its total funds, it would be in position to optimally 
adjust its total resources over time, either increasing them (if there is potential bankruptcy) 378
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4 On American and Canadian models see further FDIC (2000) Options Paper .
5 E.g., FDIC hired consulting company Oliver, Wyman and Company to develop the model (for further referen-
ces, see: FDIC, 2000); similar model was explored and developed for Romania by the Convergence team.
or decreasing them (if banking sector is safe and sound). DIS may use different methodolo-
gies (either developing its own methodology) or use risk assessment information shared by 
the supervisory authority (e.g. an early warning system). In both cases the final goal is to 
assess the probability of default by measuring credit risk. Different schemes use different 
methodologies in order to determine risk. Risk assessment models may be grouped as dif-
ferent rating-grades models and early-warning models. Among rating-grades models, the 
most commonly used are those employing some quantitative measures, either information 
collected on-site, off-site or from supervisory authority. Some schemes apply qualitative 
measures for e.g. CAMELS, but more and more schemes that develop their own methodol-
ogy use combined measures (e.g. US, Canadian4 and French deposit insurance authorities 
whose rating model is called ORAP). Some countries (e.g. Germany, Netherlands, Italy) 
use peer group analysis or models based on financial ratios. Early warning systems devel-
op models that calculate the probability of defaults of individual banks in the system.
Using the “risk-aware” approach, a DIS has the power to establish a relation between 
its resources and the risks posed by individual banks. So far, there was prevailing prac-
tice that schemes use risk assessment in financial planning relating to differential premi-
ums (where premiums paid by individual banks are in relation to their individual risk), 
but using available information for optimalization of their total fund size. If DIS potential 
liability is not connected with its financial resources, the DIS will be either over-funded 
or under-funded. This is the reason why the optimal size of resources becomes more im-
portant. A risk-aware approach, in principle, indirectly indicates a higher riskiness of the 
banking sector system, especially in economic recession. Differential premium schemes 
have strong pro-cyclical character, because higher riskiness means higher premiums, but 
they are used as a tool for fighting moral hazard. However, because of pro-cyclicality, 
differential premiums may not be a primary tool in resolving moral hazard issues. Sound 
and effective banking supervision has more power in detecting and resolving moral haz-
ard in the banking sector. 
4.2   Expected (final) loss approach in financial planning in an ex-ante deposit
insurance schemes
Expected loss approach (or sometimes called final loss) is a modern philosophy used 
for financial planning5. It has to be stressed that this approach has been explored during 
the last decade. It applies a definition of capital adequacy to the calculation (determina-
tion) of adequate resources of a DIS (optimal size of resources). This approach is signif-
icantly different from any traditional financial planning in deposit insurance, because it 
turns the focus of interest (and financial planning) on the expected loss for the DIS, not 
its nominal exposure (insured deposits) in the case of default. 
If this is properly applied, a DIS may optimize the size of its resources according to 
expected (final) loss in the case of default in a certain bank(s). The cornerstone of this ap-
proach was to model the loss distribution of deposit insurance funds. The loss distribu-
tion may be used to evaluate the appropriate level of fund adequacy and reserving. The 379
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first step in analysing DIS risk profile is to recognize that deposit insurance funds have 
contingent portfolios of credit risks. These portfolios consist of individual exposures to 
insured banks, each of which has some chance (probability) of causing a loss to the DIS. 
Such a portfolio is similar to, but not the same as, a bank loan portfolio. DIS exposure to 
individual banks can be summed to calculate a cumulative loss distribution.
The amount of total insured deposits still represents the liquidity need for DIS, but not 
all paid deposits would be lost i.e. non-recovered. For combining good collection man-
agement practice of the DIS with adequate bankruptcy regulation, a DIS may end with an 
expected loss (never collected from the bankrupted bank) that is significantly lower than 
nominal exposure i.e. total repayment to depositors. 
In such a way, a DIS will recover most of its resources; only smaller portion is “lost”. 
Focusing on expected loss only, a DIS may use a number of different financial mech-
anisms for setting the optimal premium paid by banks and the optimal size of the funds 
i.e. focusing on long term strategic financial planning. 
5 Conclusion
Deposit insurance is a specific business. On one hand it is like the corporate insur-
ance industry; on the other hand it has governments as lenders of last resort. Deposit insur-
ance, in performing its main task, is exposed to a number of risks, directly and indirectly, 
through the risks to which are its members exposed. As is established by the regulation, 
in most countries with obligatory membership, deposit insurance has the characteristics of 
monopolistic business. At present, there is no single standard-setter nor do internationally 
accepted general standards for financial planning exist. The result is that every DIS has its 
own understanding and practice of financial planning. There are some schemes that are 
satisfied with annual budgeting only. Some do not even apply risk assessment. Some try 
to optimalize their funds in the long run. All of them have more or less the same goal: to 
compensate depositors up to a prescribed coverage in the case of bank failure. It is obvi-
ous that a DIS is not going to fulfil this task if there are not enough financial resources in 
the fund, in the case of ex-ante models. But, for reasons of credibility and prudence, it is 
necessary to assure adequate financial resources and adequate size of the funds to be able 
to meet the undertaken responsibility in the foreseeable future, not only at one particular 
moment of time. An adequate size in the deposit insurance fund and its liquidity are cru-
cial issues for a deposit insurance authority in any country. If the fund is below the opti-
mal level it cannot provide adequate protection. If the fund is above the appropriate level, 
it presents a burden to member institutions. 
Reasons for the lack of clear and internationally accepted standards in deposit insur-
ance practice may be partly understood, although not justified at all, by the fact that many 
deposit insurance schemes were established as public schemes, managed by governmen-
tal agencies, not run by industry professionals. This, given the fact of its monopolistic 
position, may lead to severe negligence on the side of the management of deposit insur-
ers. These are the reasons why it would be necessary to establish internationally accepted 
financial planning principles that would be applied at an international level and adjusted 
according other characteristics and features of deposit insurance schemes. An individual 380
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DIS should undertake proper financial planning and financial management appropriate 
to the size of the financial resources collected and take the responsibility for the failures 
and negligence if accepted standards are not followed. At the moment, it is hard to blame 
the schemes for poor financial planning practice, when they are consigned to individual 
biases for want of industry standards.
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